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De se reductionism takes on monsters
Emar Maier
Radboud University Nijmegen
A de se belief is a belief about oneself from a first person point of view.
This differs from merely a de re belief about oneself as brought out by mistaken
identity scenarios like:
(1) Karen and Miina just had extreme makeovers. Karen glimpses herself
in a mirror and, mistakenly thinking she’s seeing Miina, mumbles “She’s
beautiful”. Miina simply thinks “I’m beautiful”.
Both women have de re beliefs about themselves, but only Miina has a de se
belief. The same distinction applies to belief reports:
(2)

Karen believes
{
that she’s
# to be
}
Miina believes
{
that she’s
to be
}
 beautiful
As is generally assumed, the 3rd person pronoun construction can report both
de re and de se beliefs, but the infinitival complement can only be read de se.
My account starts out with a standard analysis of de re: x believes de re of
y that it’s P iff x is related to y via an acquaintance relation R and self-ascribes
the property of bearing R to something P . I adopt a Lewisian reduction of de
se as a special case of de re, viz. the case where y = x and R is equality.
Reductions like this have been attempted before1, but arguments against
the general reductionist setup have appeared in work on de se reports. First
of all, Chierchia (1989) argues for separate de se and de re LFs on the basis of
unambiguously de se infinitives as in (2). The problem for acquaintance-style
definitions of de re/de selies in the fact that they scope the subject of the atti-
tude (‘y’ above) out of the belief operator. This becomes serious if we assume
a covert PRO with 1st person features as subject for infinitive complements.2
In any case, an analysis for embedded first persons interpreted as co-referential
with a 3rd person matrix subject is needed if we want to account for Amharic
attitude reports glossable as ‘Kareni believes Ii am beautiful’ (Schlenker 2003).
The present account adopts a simplified version of the acquaintance res-
olution framework, summarized below. First, add to the DRS language a
predicate ‘believe’ with interpretation bel ∈ [D×W→ ℘W]:
1Von Stechow (1982) (http://vivaldi.sfs.nphil.uni-tuebingen.de/~arnim10/
Aufsaetze/StructuredProp1.pdf), Reinhart (1990) (http://www.let.uu.nl/~tanya.
reinhart/personal/Papers/De_se_91.wp.pdf)
2In Schlenker’s system the first person feature accounts for the de se point of view.
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(3) [[believe(x):ϕ]]f = {w ∈ W|[[ϕ]]f ⊇ bel(f(x),w)}.
Next, add ‘center’ to represent the first person, i.e. the source of an utterance
or thought:3
(4) a. I am beautiful
b.
[
y center(y) beautiful(y)
]
c. Miina believes PRO to be beautiful
d.
[
x miina(x) believe(x):
[
y center(y) beautiful(y)
]]
[[(4d)]] is the proposition that in all of Miina’s belief alternatives the expe-
riencer is beautiful. The remainder of the paper is concerned with deriving
representations like (4d) uniformly from surface structure by ‘acquaintance
resolution’.
Consider a typical coreferential 3rd person report:
(5) Karen believes that she is beautiful
We assume that in order for this report to be truly de re, the context in which
it is uttered should provide a suitable relation of acquaintance (preferably ‘=’)
between Karen and the antecedent of ‘she’, i.e. herself. Say the context is
(1); representing that and adding the general preliminary de re representation
of (5), gives (6). The ‘
.
=’ stands for formal equality (αβη-interconvertability
of lambda terms) and the ‘?’ is a trigger to search for an appropriate DRS-
part, and then find and apply a unifying substitution for the resulting formal
equality.
(6) a.
x y
karen(x) miina(y) see in mirror(x,x)
R(x,w)
.
=?
believe(x):
[
u v
center(u) R(u,v) beautiful(v)
∂
[
w fem.3.sg.(w)
] ]

b.
x y karen(x) miina(y) see in mirror(x,x)R(x,x) .=?
believe(x):
[
u v center(u) R(u,v) beautiful(v)
]

c.
x y karen(x) miina(y) see in mirror(x,x)R(x,x) .=see in mirror(x,x)
believe(x):
[
u v center(u) R(u,v) beautiful(v)
]

d. R 7→ λ sλ t.see in mirror(s,t)
e.
[
x y
karen(x) miina(y) see in mirror(x,x)
believe(x):
[
u v center(u) see in mirror(u,v) beautiful(v)
]]
Now, if it had been ‘Miina’ instead of ‘Karen’ in (5) we would have resolved
R to =, giving rise to the preferred de se interpretation represented (minus
3Because worlds do not usually have a unique center, I would add a second dimension
of context dependence for the interpretation of indexicals like ‘center’, and consequently a
diagonalization operator for the semantics of ‘believe’, if it weren’t for lack of space.
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context) in (4d). As promised, the embedded ‘she’ is interpreted wide-scope
and as a third person (contrast (Schlenker 2003; Von Stechow 2002) who get
rid of the 3rd person feature).
Now let’s see what happens if we apply our analysis to the more challenging
(4c): a third person report with ‘shifted’ first person and only a de se reading.
Maintaining uniformity, we get (7a) for (4c) and resolve that to (7b) by binding
PRO to the closest possible first person (‘center’):
(7) a.
y miina(y), R(y,w) .=?
believe(y):
[
u v
center(u) R(u,v) beautiful(v)
∂
[
w PRO.1.sg.(w)
] ]

b.
[
y
miina(y), R(y,u)
.
=?
believe(y):
[
u v center(u) R(u,v) beautiful(v)
]]
It may seem strange that u occurs free in (7b), but note that this is an occur-
rence in a formal condition so all it does is narrow down the set of candidates
for formally equating the lambda term ‘R(y,u)’ with. Taking the smallest
suitable and non-trivial part of (7b) results in:
(8) a.
[
y
miina(y), R(y,u)
.
=believe(y):
[
center(u)
]
believe(z):
[
u v center(u) R(u,v) beautiful(v)
]]
b. R 7→ λsλt.believe(s): [ center(t)]
c.
y miina(y) believe(y):
u v center(u)believe(u): [ center(v)]
beautiful(v)

Now we’re stuck, since what we want is truth-conditionally different, viz. (4d).
What’s missing is some kind of introspection principle: if you believe to be-
lieve ϕ, you believe ϕ. Such principles have been studied in doxastic modal
logic, e.g. in the standard system for belief, KD45, we have both positive and
negative introspection, corresponding to the frame properties of transitivity
and Euclidicity. An analogon for our system of belief as property ascriptions
would be:
(9) If v ∈ bel(a,w) and b is the center of v, then bel(a,w) = bel(b, v).
In other words, the person you believe yourself to be, has, in the world you
believe to inhabit, the same beliefs as you. A simple computation of semantic
values shows the the semantic equivalence of (8c) and (4d) under (9).
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